Inequality and Income Redistribution

Summer 2023 Econ S10-A, Harvard University Prof. Josh Abel

Textbook chapter 20

Normative Analysis

- Formal normative analysis so far has focused on efficiency
 - Market maximizes size of the pie in the absence of market failures
 - Externalities, market power, asymmetric information
- But have stressed that efficiency isn't everything; distribution matters, too
 - "Price gouging can harm vulnerable consumers"
 - "International trade creates winners and losers"
- Strongest argument for efficiency: maximizing the size of the pie allows us to make everyone better off
 - Inherent in that is redistributive policy, so we need to understand that
- Price controls or taxes/subsidies/tariffs on products can help redistribute
 - But income taxation is a better way to do it

Normative Analysis (2)

- Efficiency is simpler and more object than distribution
 - There's an efficient quantity, try to get as close to it as possible
- Distributional concerns are far more complicated and inherently subjective
 - There are many many many ways to divide the pie: which do you most prefer?
 - Economic analysis: formalize your subjective beliefs, see what it implies
- Some might argue that because efficiency is objective and distribution is subjective, we should only focus on efficiency

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 - There are many many many ways to divide the pie: which do you most prefer?
 - Economic analysis: formalize your subjective beliefs, see what it implies
- Some might argue that because efficiency is objective and distribution is subjective, we should only focus on efficiency
 - That is wrong! Ignoring distribution IS implicitly making a decision about what a good distribution is, whether you mean to or not.
- Will start lecture today by describing distribution of resources not so easy!
- Will then discuss the theory of redistribution

Inequality

Modern Wealth Inequality in the US

WEALTH INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1913: EVIDENCE FROM CAPITALIZED INCOME TAX DATA*

EMMANUEL SAEZ AND GABRIEL ZUCMAN


Wealth group	Number of families	Wealth threshold	Average wealth	Wealth share
	Panel A: Top v	vealth groups		
Full Population	160,700,000		\$343,000	100%
Top 10%	16,070,000	\$660,000	\$2,560,000	77.2%
Top 1%	1,607,000	\$3,960,000	\$13,840,000	41.8%
Top 0.1%	160,700	\$20,600,000	\$72,800,000	22.0%
Top .01%	16,070	\$111,000,000	\$371,000,000	11.2%
	Panel B: Intermedia	ate wealth group	os	
Bottom 90%	144,600,000		\$84,000	22.8%
Top 10-1%	14,463,000	\$660,000	\$1,310,000	35.4%
Top 1-0.1%	1,446,300	\$3,960,000	\$7,290,000	19.8%
Top 0.1-0.01%	144,600	\$20,600,000	\$39,700,000	10.8%
Top .01%	16,070	\$111,000,000	\$371,000,000	11.2%

THRESHOLDS AND AVERAGE WEALTH IN TOP WEALTH GROUPS, 2012

Historical Wealth Inequality in the US

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
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
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Modern Racial Wealth Gap in the US

Disparities in Wealth by Race and Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances

Neil Bhutta, Andrew C. Chang, Lisa J. Dettling, and Joanne W. Hsu with assistance from Julia Hewitt¹




Mean Net Worth

Historical Racial Wealth Gap in the US

Wealth of Two Nations: The U.S. Racial Wealth Gap, 1860-2020 Ellora Derenoncourt, Chi Hyun Kim, Moritz Kuhn, and Moritz Schularick NBER Working Paper No. 30101


June 2022

Figure 1: White-Black per capita wealth ratio: 1860-2020



Modern Income Inequality in the US

Average Household Income Before Transfers and Taxes, 2019




Data source: Congressional Budget Office. See www.cbo.gov/publication/58353#data.

Historical Income Inequality in the US


The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality in America: Evidence from Distributional Macroeconomic Accounts

Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman







Average Income for 35-year-olds




Average Income for 35-year-olds with Low-Earning Parents



Average Income for 35-year-olds with High-Earning Parents



Average Income for Black 35-year-olds with High-Earning Parents



Income Redistribution


Equity and Efficiency

- Status Quo: \$80 for person A and \$20 for person B
 - Total: \$100
- Alternative 1: \$60 for person A and \$40 for person B
 - Total: \$100
- Nearly everyone (including economists) would prefer Alternative 1 to Status Quo
 - Same pie, more evenly distributed

Equity and Efficiency


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- Nearly everyone (including economists) would prefer Alternative 1 to Status Quo
 - Same pie, more equitable
- Alternative 2: \$50 for person A and \$30 for person B
 - Total: \$80
- People will differ if forced to choose between Status Quo and Alternative 2
 - Alternative 2 shrunk the size of the pie: inefficient
 - Alternative 2 made person B better off: more equitable
 - Took away \$30 from person A, gave only \$10 to person B
- Society must decide how much it's willing to shrink the pie to make it more equitable

Income Redistribution in the US



Data source: Congressional Budget Office. See www.cbo.gov/publication/58353#data.


Average Tax Rates in the US




Average Federal Tax Rates, by Tax Source, 2019

Data source: Congressional Budget Office. See www.cbo.gov/publication/58353#data.


A Model with Inequality



Redistributive Flat Tax




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
"The Leaky Bucket"

- Tension between equity and efficiency
- Redistributing from rich to poor shrinks the size of the pie
 - Efficiency cost/DWL
- Payoff from earning money is diminished, discourages productive activity
 - Incentives are distorted
- "Leaky bucket"
 - Redistributing resources can be done
 - But some of the resources get lost along the way
 - Excess Burden


Progressive Income Tax




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
Progressive Income Tax




Elastic Labor Supply




Elastic Labor Supply



Elastic Labor Supply



Progressive Income Tax (repeated)




Preferences and Constraints

- A Democrat is likely to support more redistribution than a Republican is
- 2 primary economic reasons for this:
 - 1. Republican might perceive greater elasticities
 - "The bucket is very leaky!"
 - 2. Republican may be less concerned with inequality
 - "To the victor goes the spoils."
- #1 is objective: ultimately a question of how much inefficiency is caused by taxation
 - Hard to measure, though! Most formal studies find the elasticity is small, but hard to be confident.
- #2 is a subjective/preference issue
 - More an issue of philosophy than economics


Social Preferences

MSWW

- <u>Marginal Social Welfare Weight</u>: how much you value giving \$1 to a person
 - Statement of social preference




Social Preferences




Social Preferences


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 - "\$1 is \$1, doesn't matter who gets it just maximize the size of the pie"




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


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





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
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
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
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
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


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




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
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


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
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
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


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


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


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- 4. Only care about the poorest individual ("Mother Teresa")




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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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 - Extract maximal tax revenue
 - Should tax rate on high earners be 100%?




"Show me your budget, and I'll tell you what you value."


- Modern states have very "non-linear" tax codes
 - Almost like a different tax rate on each dollar you earn
- Using fancy versions of the model we just used, economists can infer how much the tax code "cares" about people of different income levels
- Jacobs et al (2017) for the Netherlands





"Show me your budget, and I'll tell you what you value."


- Modern states have very "non-linear" tax codes
 - Almost like a different tax rate on each dollar you earn
- Using fancy versions of the model we just used, economists can infer how much the tax code "cares" about people of different income levels
- Hendren (2020) for United States














Non-Economic Policy Rationales

- Textbook model says we should never subsidize labor
 - It creates a distortion without raising revenue
- Yet EITC has massive bipartisan support. Why?

Non-Economic Policy Rationales


- Textbook model says we should never subsidize labor
 - It creates a distortion without raising revenue
- Yet EITC has massive bipartisan support. Why?
 - "Work is good"?
 - "Deserving vs. undeserving poor"?
- Economic analysis can't say that someone's non-economic rationale is "wrong"
 - If you think it's better for people to work more, regardless of the costs and benefits, that's kind of up to you
- But economic analysis can show the economic cost that such a policy imposes


Change to Tax Code vs. Optimal Tax Code


- Lecture has been very critical of the EITC, but...
- ... I really do not want the EITC to be repealed...
- ...even for purely economic reasons.


Change to Tax Code vs. Optimal Tax Code


- Lecture has been very critical of the EITC, but...
- ... I really do not want the EITC to be repealed...
- ...even for purely economic reasons.
- I don't think that the *optimal* tax code would involve the EITC
 - Redistribution would be unconditional, rather than conditional on working
 - "Universal Basic Income"
- But I don't think our tax code is optimal, or close to it
- Removing the EITC would be regressive and remove income support for many people
- So, removing EITC would move us further from the optimal tax code, not closer
 - Even though the optimal tax code would not have an EITC
- If you believe that the tax code is already too redistributive, then removing the EITC probably would seem like a good policy change











Incidence Matters, Too!

- Previously, had only focused on inefficiency/DWL
 - Perfectly elastic Labor Demand kept the wage constant (no incidence analysis)
- In reality, some of the benefits of the EITC actually go to employers
 - This makes EITC an even less effective tool for redistribution
- This problem also plagues in-kind benefits transfers
 - Grocery stores raise prices when money for Food Stamps is distributed
- There are many, many factors that affect how successful policy is!

Redistribution

Broadly speaking, equity should be pursued through (progressive) income taxation

- Price controls (e.g. rent control) may help some low-income people, but they cause distortions and interfere with some things that the market does very well
- Taxing goods distorts the decision of which goods to buy
 - If you tax Apples and not Bananas, society will over-consume Bananas
- Taxing income distorts the decision of how much to work, but...

Redistribution

Broadly speaking, equity should be pursued through (progressive) income taxation

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- Taxing goods distorts the decision of which goods to buy
 - If you tax Apples and not Bananas, society will over-consume Bananas
- Taxing income distorts the decision of how much to work, but...
- ...so does taxing goods! Taxing goods causes a "double distortion"
 - Lowers the "real wage" and so discourages work
 - Distorts prices and causes people to consume inefficient bundles
- Taxing income does cause inefficiency, but that's inherent in redistributive policy
 - Income taxation avoids causing other distortions
 - It is the most efficient of these inefficient options